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Abstrat One lass of dierential games with random duration is onsid-
ered. It is assumed that duration of the game is a random variable with
values from a given nite interval. The game an be interrupted only on this
interval. Methods of onstrution feedbak and open-loop Nash equilibria
for suh games are proposed.
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1. Introdution
Dierential game theory is ommonly used to desribe realisti onit-ontrolled
proesses with many partiipants. When modeling eonomi or environmental pro-
esses, many researhers turn to the use of dierential games with nite or innite
duration. However, the reently popular diretion of studying games with random
duration allows to simulate a proess lose to the real one, in whih the terminal
time of the game is not known in advane, but is an implementation of some random
variable (Petrosjan and Murzov, 1966; Petrosjan and Shevkoplyas, 2000; Shevko-
plyas, 2014). For the rst time the lass of dierential games with random duration
was introdued in (Petrosyan and Murzov, 1966) for a partiular ase of a zero-sum
pursuit game. Later, the general formulation of the dierential games with random
duration was given in (Petrosyan and Shevkoplyas, 2000).
The aim of this paper is to investigate the ase when the ending of the game is
possible not over the whole period of the game, but only at a ertain given interval.
Players know that the game will not be interrupted until a ertain point. After this
moment, the game may abruptly end. Consideration of the problem in this vein
leads to the fat that payos of players an be represented as sums of integrals with
dierent but adjoint time intervals. The paper provides ways to onstrut open-loop
and feedbak Nash equilibria in this lass of games.
The paper is strutured as follows. In setion 2 the problem formulation is given.
One method of onstrution feedbak Nash equilibrium is onsidered in setion 3.
This method is applied to an illustrative example in setion 3.1. The onstrution
of Nash equilibrium in open-loop strategies is investigated in setion 4. In setion
4.1 open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies are studied for the example from se. 3.1.
⋆
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2. Problem Formulation
Consider dierential n-player game Γ (x0, T − t0) dened on the interval [t0, T ]
with the system dynamis desribed by dierential equations:
ẋ(t) = g(t, x, u),
x(t0) = x0,
x ∈ Rl, u = (u1, . . . , un), ui = ui(t) ∈ Ui ⊂ ompRk.
(1)
The game Γ (x0, T − t0) starts from initial state x0 at the time instant t0. But
duration of the game is not xed. We assume that T is a random variable with






0, for τ < T − δ,
ϕ(τ), for T − δ ≤ τ < T + δ,
1, for τ ≥ T + δ,
(2)
where ϕ(τ) is assumed to be an absolutely ontinuous nondereasing funtion sat-
isfying the following onditions: ϕ(T − δ) = 0, ϕ(T + δ) = 1. This means that the
game ould end only during the period [T − δ, T + δ], where δ ∈ [t0, T ].
The expeted payo of player i ∈ N in Γ (x0, T − t0) is dened in the following
way:








hi[s, x(s), u]dsdF (τ). (3)
Aording to (Gromova and Tur, 2017), where the transformation proedure of
the double integral funtional and its redution to a single integral is desribed, the
expeted payo of player i ∈ N an be represented in the form:






hi[s, x(s), u](1− F (s))ds. (4)
And the expeted payo of player i in subgame Γ (x(t), T − t), starting at the
moment t from x(t) is:















hi[s, x(s), u](1− F (s))ds, for t ∈ [T − δ, T + δ).
(5)
We assume an existene of a probability density funtion f(t) = F ′(t).
3. Feedbak Nash Equilibrium. Hamilton-Jaobi-Bellman Equations
One of the priniples of optimality in non-ooperative dierential games is a
feedbak Nash equilibrium. Feedbak Nash equilibrium strategies depend only on
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the time variable and the urrent value of the state, but not on memory (inlud-
ing the initial state x0) (Basar and Olsder, 1995). We use the suient onditions
of Hamiltom-Jaobi-Bellman equations in order to nd a feedbak Nash equilib-
rium. The Hamilton-Jaobi-Bellman equations for dierential games with random
duration was proposed in (Shevkoplyas, 2014). Here this method is adapted for the
problem under onsideration.
In the framework of this approah the Bellman funtion V i(t, x) is dened as
the payo of player i in feedbak Nash equilibrium uNE(t, x) in the subgame of
Γ (x(t), T − t) starting at the instant t ∈ [T −δ, T+δ] in the state x(t). And W i(t, x)
is a payo of player i in feedbak Nash equilibrium uNE(t, x) in the subgame of
Γ (x(t), T − t) starting at the instant t ∈ [t0, T − δ] in the state x(t).
The following theorem takes plae:
Theorem 1. uNE(t, x) is the Nash equilibrium in feedbak strategies in the dif-
ferential game Γ (x0, T − t0), if there exist ontinuously dierentiable funtions
V i(t, x) : [T − δ, T + δ]×Rl → R, i ∈ N and W i(t, x) : [t0, T − δ]×Rl → R, i ∈ N ,
satisfying the following system of partial dierential equations:
ϕ̇(t)
1−ϕ(t)V
i(t, x)− V it (t, x) = max
φi
{
hi(t, x, uNE−i ) + V
i





= hi(t, x, uNE) + V ix(t, x)g(t, x, u
NE), i ∈ N,
V i(T + δ, x(T + δ)) = 0, i ∈ N,
−W it (t, x) = max
φi
{
hi(t, x, uNE−i ) +W
i





hi(t, x, uNE) +W ix(t, x)g(t, x, u
NE) i ∈ N,
W i(T − δ, x(T − δ)) = V i(T − δ, x(T − δ)), i ∈ N,
(6)
where uNE−i (φi) = (u
NE
1 , . . . , φi, . . . , u
NE
n ).
Proof. Dene I1 = [t0, T − δ] and I2 = [T − δ, T + δ].
First, onsider our problem on the segment I2. The payo of player i ∈ N on I2
is given by





hi[s, x(s), u](1− F (s))ds, for t ∈ [T − δ, T + δ).
(7)
The Bellman funtion V i(t, x) is dened as the payo of player i in feedbak
Nash equilibrium uNE(t, x) in the subgame of Γ (x(t), T − t) starting at the instant
t ∈ [T − δ, T + δ] in the state x(t).
Aording to (Shevkoplyas, 2014) HJB equations for nding Nash equilibrium
in the game with payos of the form (7) are as follows:
ϕ̇(t)
1−ϕ(t)V
i(t, x)− V it (t, x) = max
φi
{
hi(t, x, uNE−i ) + V
i





= hi(t, x, uNE) + V ix(t, x)g(t, x, u
NE), i ∈ N,
V i(T + δ, x(T + δ)) = 0, i ∈ N,
(8)
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where uNE−i (φi) = (u
NE
1 , . . . , φi, . . . , u
NE
n ).
Consider now our problem starting at some moment t ∈ I1. The payo of player
i ∈ N is:
KI1i (x(t), T − t;u) =
T−δ∫
t
hi[s, x(s), u]ds+ Vi(T − δ, x(T − δ)), (9)
where Vi(T − δ, x(T − δ))  the payo of player i in Nash equilibrium for the period
I2. The value Vi(T − δ, x(T − δ)) is onsidered as a terminal payo of player i for
the period I1. So we get the seond part of (6):
−W it (t, x) = max
φi
{
hi(t, x, uNE−i ) +W
i





hi(t, x, uNE) +W ix(t, x)g(t, x, u
NE) i ∈ N,
W i(T − δ, x(T − δ)) = V i(T − δ, x(T − δ)), i ∈ N,
(10)
where uNE−i (φi) = (u
NE
1 , . . . , φi, . . . , u
NE
n ).
3.1. Dierential Game of Investment
Consider an illustrative example. Assume that there are n individuals who invest
in a publi stok of knowledge (Dokner et al., 2000). Let x(t) be the stok of
knowledge at time t and ui(t, x)  the investment of agent i in publi knowledge at
time t. The stok of knowledge evolves aording to the aumulation equation:
ẋ(t) = u1(t) + u2(t) + . . .+ un(t), x(0) = x0. (11)
If eah agent derives linear utility from the onsumption of the stok of knowl-
edge, the expeted payo of player i ∈ N is given by




qix(t) − riu2i (t)
)
dt. (12)
Assume that the random variable T distributed uniformly on [T − δ, T + δ]. The





0, for τ < T − δ,
t−T+δ
2δ , for T − δ ≤ τ < T + δ,
1, for τ ≥ T + δ.
(13)
3.2. Feedbak Nash Equilibrium
To nd the feedbak Nash equilibrium in the subgame, starting at the time
instant T − δ from the state x(T − δ), onsider the rst part of HJB equations (6):
1
T+δ−t
V i(t, x) − V it (t, x) = max
ui




Vi(T + δ, x(T + δ)) = 0, i ∈ N.
(14)
Bellman funtion is dened in the form: V i(t, x) = ai(t)x+bi(t). The maximiza-
tion problem in (14) yields a strategy for player i:
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T + δ − tai(t)− qi, i ∈ N, (15)





(T + δ − t).
For bi(t) we have:
ḃi(t) =
1








, i ∈ N, (16)















Then the feedbak Nash equilibrium strategies on I2 are:
uNEi (t, x) =
qi
4ri
(T + δ − t), i = 1 ∈ N, t ∈ [T − δ, T + δ].
The payo of player i ∈ N in Nash equilibrium for the period I2 looks as follows:
Vi(T − δ, x(T − δ)) = qiδx(T − δ) + 2miδ3, i ∈ N. (18)
Then, the bound ondition for the problem on I1 is:
Wi(T − δ, x(T − δ)) = qiδx(T − δ) + 2miδ3, i ∈ N.
To nd the feedbak Nash equilibrium in the subgame, starting at the time
instant t0 from x0 and ending at T − δ in x(T − δ), onsider the system of HJB
equations:







uNEj )), i ∈ N, (19)
W i(T − δ, x(T − δ)) = qiδx(T − δ) + 2miδ3, i ∈ N.
Bellman funtion is dened in the form: W i(t, x) = ci(t)x + di(t). The maxi-




Substituting it into (19) we have the following system of dierential equations for
ci(t):
ċi(t) = −qi, i ∈ N (20)
ci(T − δ) = qiδ.
Then
ci(t) = qi(T − t).
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, i ∈ N, (21)























(T − t), i = 1 ∈ N, t ∈ [t0, T − δ],
qi
4ri
(T + δ − t), i = 1 ∈ N, t ∈ [T − δ, T + δ].
4. Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium
The seond part of the paper is devoted to onstrution of open-loop Nash
equilibrium for the game under onsideration, whih depends only on the time
parameter t and the initial state of the system (Basar and Olsder, 1995).
The method we introdue here is based on Pontryagin's maximum priniple
(Pontryagin et al., 1963).
We will nd the solution on two intervals I1 = [t0;T − δ] and I2 = [T − δ;T + δ].
The boundary onditions at time T − δ are onsidered as parameters. We will nd
their values at the end of the solution from the maximization ondition.
Let's start with studying the game at the period I1.
Eah player i ∈ N tries to maximize
T−δ∫
t
hi[s, x(s), u]ds for dynami (1). The
problem will be solved with two xed ends: x(t0) = x0 and x(T − δ) = x1. Intro-
due x1 as a parameter of the solution (we will see that x1 is indeed a funtion
of n parameters). The use of suh a method for ooperative dierential games was
proposed in (Gromov and Gromova, 2017), (Gromova and Magnitskaya, 2019). Here
we adapt it for non-ooperative games.
On the interval I1 the Hamiltonian for player i is:
Hi(x, u
NE
−i , ψ) = ψig(t, x, u
NE
−i ) + h
i(t, x, uNE−i ), i ∈ N. (23)
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We introdue the boundary onditions ψi(T − δ) = zi as parameters of the solu-
tion. Let uNEI1 (s, z1, . . . , zn)  equilibrium strategies on I1. And the equilibrium tra-
jetory xNEI1 (t, z1, . . . , zn) we an found from (1). And x1 = x
NE
I1
(T − δ, z1, . . . , zn).




hi[s, x(s), u](1 − F (s))ds for dynami (1) with initial
ondition x(T − δ) = x1 = xNEI1 (T − δ, z1, . . . , zn), and with a loose right end.
The Hamiltonian for player i is:
Hi(x, u
NE
−i , ψ) = ψig(t, x, u
NE
−i ) + (1 − F (t))hi(t, x, uNE−i ). (25)















ψi(T + δ) = 0.
Let uNEI2 (t, z1, . . . , zn)  equilibrium strategies on I2 and x
NE
I2
(t, z1, . . . , zn) -
equilibrium trajetory on I2.






















where z∗−i = (z
∗




i−1, . . . , z
∗
n).





1 , . . . , z
∗
n)I1 , t ∈ [t0, T − δ],
uNEi (t, z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
n)I2 , t ∈ [T − δ, T + δ].
(28)
The method of onstruting strategies (28) ensures that they are equilibrium
strategies.
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4.1. Dierential Game of Investment. Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium
Consider again the example suggested in setion 3. Find the solution in the lass
of open-loop strategies.
Intervals I1
Let's start with studying the game at the period I1.
Payo of player i on I1 is
T−δ∫
0
(qix(t)− riu2i (t))dt for dynami (1).
The Hamiltonian for player i is:
Hi(x, u, ψ) = ψi(ui +
∑
j 6=i
uNEj )) + qix(t)− riu2i (t). (29)









The Hessian matrix is negative denite hene we onlude that Hamiltonian Hi
is onave w.r.t. ui, t ∈ [0, T − δ],
∂2Hi
∂u2i
= −2ri < 0.
The adjoint equations are as follows:
∂ψi
∂t
= −∂Hi(x, u, ψ)
∂x
= −qi. (30)
We introdue the boundary onditions ψi(T−δ) = zi, i = 1, . . . , n as parameters
of the solution.
Hene,
ψi(t) = zi − qit,

























We use the boundary ondition:
x(0) = x0. (32)
Then the optimal trajetory for the interval I1:
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(1− t−T+δ2δ )(qix(t)−riu2i (t))dt for dynami (1) and initial
ondition x(T − δ) = xNEI1 (T − δ, z1, . . . , zn).
The Hamiltonian for player i is:
Hi(x, u, φ) = φi(ui +
∑
j 6=i
uNEj )) + (1−
t− T + δ
2δ
)(qix(t)− riu2i (t)). (34)




= φi − 2(1−





(δ − t+ T )ri
.
The Hessian matrix is negative denite hene we onlude that Hamiltonian Hi
is onave w.r.t. ui, t ∈ [T − δ;T + δ],
∂2Hi
∂u2i
= −2(1− t− T + δ
2δ
)ri < 0.
The adjoint equations are:
∂φi
∂t
= −∂Hi(x, u, φ)
∂x




φi(T + δ) = 0, i ∈ N. (36)
We get the solution of (35)-(36):
φi = −




2 − (T − δ)2)
4δ
+ qiδ. (37)
To get the optimal trajetory substitute (37) into (11):
ẋ(t) =
δ






The boundary ondition is the following: x(T − δ) = xNEI1 (T − δ, z1, . . . , zn) =
z(T − δ)− q̃(T−δ)
2
2 + x0.
Then the optimal trajetory is:
xNEI2 (t) = z(T − δ)−
q̃(T − δ)2
2
+ x0 + C(t), (38)
where C(t) is an expression independent of z1, . . . , zn.
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Optimal strategies on I2 have the form:
uNEi (t)I2 = (−








(δ − t+ T )ri
=
=




We nd z1, . . . , zn from the maximization ondition of the total payo in the interval










NE(t)I1 − riuNEi (t)2I1)dt+
T+δ∫
T−δ
(1− t− T + δ
2δ
)(qix











+ qiz(T − δ)δ +B(T , δ), (40)
where B(T , δ) is an expression independent of z1, . . . , zn.
To nd z∗i we use the neessary ondition for the maximum:
∂Ki
∂zi












= 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
we have:





, t ∈ [0, T − δ],
uNEi (t)I2 =
qi(T + δ − t)
4ri
, t ∈ [T − δ, T + δ].
It an be noted, that in the game under onsideration open-loop and feedbak
equilibrium strategies oinide. This is also harateristi of lassial dierential
games with a linear struture.





, and these are Nash equilibrium strategies
in the dierential game with presribed duration T − t0.
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4.2. Numeri Example
Consider the previous example with numeri parameters.






uNE1 (t)I1 = 10− t,




uNE3 (t)I1 = 6−
3t
5

























, t ∈ [7, 13].















Fig. 1. Nash equilibrium trajetory
















Fig. 2. Equilibrium strategy for player 1
5. Conlusion
The speial lass of dierential games with random duration is investigated.
The method of onstrution feedbak Nash equilibrium based on Hamilton-Jaobi-
Bellman equations is proposed. The method of onstrution open-loop Nash equilib-
rium based on Pontryagin's maximum priniple is studied. An illustrative example
demonstrating both of two methods is onsidered. The numerial example is given.
The results are drawn.
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Fig. 3. Equilibrium strategy for player 2














Fig. 4. Equilibrium strategy for player 3
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